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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
ADVERSE POSSESSION. The previous owner of
the disputed land owned all 640 acres and sold several one
acre parcels to third parties. In 1962, the plaintiff
purchased the previous owner’s rights in all 640 acres and
built a fence around the entire parcel and a fence through
the middle of the entire parcel. The plaintiff used almost
all of the land for grazing and crop production from the
date of purchase through the time of trial. The defendant
negotiated an oil and gas drilling lease with the plaintiff.
The lease included a provision to allow the defendant to
negotiate leases with the title owners of the one-acre
parcels but not to the detriment of the plaintiff’s title. The
plaintiff claimed title to the entire 640 acres under adverse
possession. The plaintiff sued for slander of title after the
defendant entered into leases with the title owners of the
one-acre parcels, arguing that the plaintiff had title to the
entire 640 acres. The plaintiff obtained a jury verdict
which found that the plaintiff had title by adverse
possession for over 25 years. The court found that the
plaintiff had purchased several of the parcels from the title
owners, but held that, because title by adverse possession
had already occurred prior to the purchases, the purchases
did not defeat the plaintiff’s claim by adverse possession.
Santa Fe Energy Operating Partners v. Carrillo, 948
S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was injured while riding a
horse owned by the defendants. The plaintiff had ridden
the horse before with dressage tack. The day of the
accident, the horse was equipped with hunter-jumper tack
and the plaintiff claimed that the defendants were at fault
for allowing the plaintiff to ride the horse when equipped
with unfamiliar tack. A jury awarded the plaintiff damages
of $250,000. The defendants had claimed the defense of
assumption of risk which was rejected by the trial court
which allowed the case to go to the jury. The appellate
court reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, the
plaintiff has assumed the known risks of riding the horse.
The appellate court found that the plaintiff was an
experienced horse rider, was aware of the equipment on
the horse, and was aware of the inherent risks of
horseriding. Young v. Brandt, 485 S.E.2d 519 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1997).
The plaintiff was a nine year old who was invited to
the defendants’ home by the child of the defendants for
play. The defendants’ child started training with a lunge
line a horse on the property and asked the plaintiff to help.
The plaintiff was kicked by the horse while trying to help
the defendants’ child control the horse. The plaintiff sued
for negligence and the defendants countered that the
Nebraska Recreation Liability Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 37-
1001 et seq., barred any liability for the accident. The trial
court ruled that the Act did apply and dismissed the case.
The appellate court reversed, holding that a nine year old
child invited to the defendants’ house by their child was
not a member of the public to which the Act applied. The
court noted that the purpose of the Act was to encourage
the open use of rural lands for the general public and did
not apply to residential and family situations such as the
accident involved here. Brown v. Wilson, 567 N.W.2d
124 (Neb. 1997).
BANKRUPTCY
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISMISSAL. The debtors had filed two previous
Chapter 12 cases and all three cases were filed on the eve
of a foreclosure sale of the debtors’ farm. In the first case
the debtors and the farm mortgage holder entered into a
court-approved stipulation that, if the debtors defaulted on
any plan payments on the bank’s claim, the bank would be
allowed to foreclose against the farm without interference
of a subsequent bankruptcy filing. The debtors defaulted
on the plan payments in the first two cases, causing
dismissal of the cases, and filed a new Chapter 12 case
when the bank sought to foreclose. The bank filed a
motion to dismiss the current case for cause because (1)
the filing of the second and third cases violated the
agreement and (2) the debtors could not propose a feasible
plan.  The court dismissed the debtors’ case for cause
because (1) the filing of the second and third cases
violated the court-ordered stipulation, (2) the three cases
were filed primarily to stop the foreclosure sales, and (3)
the debtors’ plans were not feasible, given that the debtors
had delayed the foreclosure for over four years and still
could not meet their projected income and expenses. The
court held that the third plan had unreasonable projections
of income and expense, based on the performance of the
farm during the bankruptcy cases. In re Wald, 211 B.R.
359 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1997).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor had filed three previous
Chapter 13 cases and sought to discharge taxes due more
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than three years before the current Chapter 13 case. The
IRS argued that the three previous cases tolled the three
year limitation period of Section 507(a)(8)(A) during the
pendency of the three previous cases. The court
determined the dischargeability of the tax claims by
tolling the Section 507(a)(8)(A) period during each
bankruptcy case plus 60 days; thus, tax claims which were
not tolled during a total of 1095 days from the date the
return was due until the filing of the current case were not
discharged. In re Zecco, 211 B.R. 109 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1997).
ENVIRONMENT
CLEAN WATER ACT. The EPA filed a claim in the
debtor’s Chapter 12 case for violations of the Clean Water
Act resulting from dredging of wetlands. However, the
evidence showed that the debtor did not do the dredging or
own the land when the dredging occurred.  The debtor was
leasing land form the owner and managed the project. The
dredging was specifically designed and ordered by the
then owner of the land. The debtor purchased the land
after the dredging occurred. The court found that the
debtor was engaged in farming on the land which was
used for llama and horse raising, entitling the debtor to an
exemption from the permit requirement under the CWA.
The court also found that the dredging actually increased
the wetlands character of the land and fostered the
purposes of the CWA in increasing the wildlife usefulness
of the land. Therefore, because the debtor did not have
control over the project, was entitled to a farmer
exemption, and did not harm the wetlands character of the
land, the EPA claim was disallowed. In re Carsten, 211




BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has issued proposed
regulations concerning the interstate movement of cattle
by changing the classification of California from Class A
to Class Free. 62 Fed. Reg. 53531 (Oct. 15, 1997).
DISASTER ASSISTANCE. The CCC has issued
interim regulations amending the Noninsured Crop
Disaster Assistance Program (NAP) for: aquacultural
species; floriculture; forage; ornamental nursery; seed
crops; reseeding or replanting of the same crop; and value
loss crops. The amendments include redefining some
existing terms and adding new terms and changes of
applicability, eligibility, assistance, yield determinations,
acreage and production reports, loss requirements, and
payments for reduced yields and prevented planting. The
changes include: (1) specifying that, except for ornamental
nursery and species or types and varieties of forage
determined by CCC to be predominantly grazed, different
species or types and varieties may be treated as separate
crops; (2) establishing a method for CCC to determine the
value of an animal unit day; (3) specifying that CCC will
establish expected area yields, or an equivalent measure in
the event yield data are not available; (4) including that,
for forage, acreage reports must include the species or type
and variety of forage reported, and the intended harvest
method, i.e. grazing or mechanically harvested; (5)
requiring reseeding or replanting where it is practicable;
and (6) including payments for losses of forage
determined by CCC to be predominantly grazed. 62 Fed.
Reg. 53929 (Oct. 17, 1997).
PESTICIDES. See the following case under Products
Liability, infra. Deshotel v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 969 F.
Supp. 397 (W.D. La. 1997).
PRODUCTION LOANS. The CCC has issued
proposed regulations under the production flexibility
contract regulations.
The proposed regulations add a final date for producers
to designate payment shares and provide supporting
documentation to be eligible to earn contract payments in
a given fiscal year when payment shares have not been
designated in such fiscal year. All producers sharing in the
contract payment on a farm, whose payment shares have
not been designated for such fiscal year must sign a new
contract designating payment shares, and provide
supporting documentation no later than August 1 of such
fiscal year to be eligible to earn a contract payment in such
fiscal year.
The proposed regulations change the dates a producer
or owner must inform the county committee of changes in
interest. A producer or owner must inform the county
committee of changes in interest by August 1 of the fiscal
year in which the change is made if producers on the
contract remain the same but payment shares change; or
no later than August 1 of such fiscal year, if a new
producer is being added to the contract.
    The proposed regulations add a final date to request
advance payments for fiscal year 1998 and each
subsequent fiscal year. To receive the advance payment
for fiscal year 1998, and each subsequent fiscal year, all
producers sharing in the contract payment on the farm
must, no later than 15 days prior to the final date to issue
the advance payment: (1) sign the contract designating
payment shares and provide supporting documentation, if
applicable; and (2) request the advance payment.
The proposed regulations clarify that a lease is a cash
lease, if the lessor receives only a guaranteed sum certain
cash payment, or fixed quantity of the crop. This rule also
changes provisions with respect to combination leases.
Combination leases are leases that contain provisions for
both a guaranteed amount such as a fixed dollar amount,
or quantity and a share of a crop or crop proceeds.
Combination leases include those leases that provide for
the greater of a guaranteed amount, or share of the crop or
crop proceeds. The amendment provides that all
combination leases shall be considered share leases for
fiscal year 1998, and later fiscal years.
The proposed regulations change the date by which all
landowners, tenants and sharecroppers failing to reach an
agreement regarding the division of contract payments for
a fiscal year, must execute a contract to be eligible to
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receive the contract payment for such fiscal year. If the
landowners, tenants and sharecroppers on a farm fail to
reach an agreement regarding the division of contract
payments for a fiscal year, the county committee shall
make the payment at a later date if all persons eligible to
receive a share of the contract payment, have executed a
contract no later than August 1 of that fiscal year, and
subsequently agreed to the division of contract payment.
62 Fed. Reg. 55150 (Oct. 23, 1997).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* In order to increase
the marital deduction, the surviving spouse asked several
legatees of the decedent's will to disclaim their interests in
the devises. Although no specific promises were made, the
legatees testified that they understood that the surviving
spouse would recompense them for the disclaimers, and
indeed, these legatees did receive money or property equal
to or exceeding the value of the disclaimed interests a
short time after filing the disclaimers. The Tax Court held
that the marital deduction could not include the disclaimed
property because the disclaimers were not effective since
the legatees still received a benefit from the estate. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the mere expectation
that a disclaimant will receive the disclaimed property
from the party who receives the disclaimed property was
insufficient consideration for the disclaimer to make the
disclaimer unqualified for federal estate tax purposes. The
court then reviewed each disclaimer as to whether the
disclaimant received sufficient consideration, in whatever
form, for the disclaimer. The court remanded the case for
the lower court to determine if some disclaimers were
mutually bargained for which would disqualify the
disclaimers. One of the three judge panel dissented.
Monroe v. Comm'r, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,292
(5th Cir. 1997), rev’g,  104 T.C. 352 (1995).
DISTRIBUTABLE NET INCOME. The taxpayer
was the spouse of the decedent and elected the Florida
elective share instead of taking under the decedent’s will.
The elective share was determined as of the date of the
decedent’s death but the share was not paid until late in
the tax year of the decedent’s death. During the year after
the decedent’s death, the estate had income from interest
and dividends accrued and received after the decedent’s
death, capital gains from the post-death sale of estate
property and distributions of income from an IRA. The
post-death income was used by the estate to pay the
taxpayer’s elective share  and the issue was whether the
taxable income nature of the funds was recognized as
income to the taxpayer. The court held that the payment of
the elective share was a distribution of estate property not
taxable to the taxpayer because the elective share was
determined as of the date of death and did not benefit from
any of the items of income. Deutsch v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1997-470.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. A decedent
established a trust for a spouse which named the spouse
and an independent company as co-trustees. The trust paid
the spouse from net trust income amounts, in the co-
trustees’ discretion, for the spouse’s support and
maintenance. The trust also provided, however, that the
independent trustee alone had the discretion to make
distributions to the spouse from trust principal. The trust
allowed the spouse to be the sole trustee if the independent
trustee could not serve but did not give the spouse
authority to distribute trust principal. The IRS ruled that,
because the trust specifically did not grant the spouse any
power to distribute trust corpus, the spouse did not have a
general power of appointment over trust principal. The
IRS noted that, under state law, although the trust did not
provide for a successor trustee, a state court had the power
to appoint a successor trustee. Ltr. Rul. 9742024, July 18,
1997.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS. In
January 1989, the decedent executed a durable power of
attorney naming the decedent’s son as attorney-in-fact and
giving the son the power to “sell, purchase, mortgage and
convey” any property owned by the decedent. In
September 1990, the son donated some of the decedent’s
property to a charitable organization. The decedent died in
March 1991. The IRS disallowed a gift tax charitable
deduction for the donation because the son exceeded the
authority of the power of attorney, since the son did not
have any expressed power to donate the decedent’s
property. The court denied the IRS motion for summary
judgment, holding that the power of attorney document
was ambiguous. The court also held that the estate could
submit evidence of the decedent’s intent as to the authority
of the son to donate the decedent’s property. Estate of
Smith, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60, 291 (D. Vt.
1997).
TRUSTS. A parent established a trust for a child with
trustee discretion to distribute trust income to the child at
least annually. The parent’s spouse served as co-trustee
with an attorney. The trust provided for passing of a
portion of trust principal to the child at the death of the
parent. At the death of the child, the trust could pass under
a limited power of appointment to the issue of the child. A
second attorney was named as a first successor co-trustee.
The parties entered into an agreement giving the spouse a
right to refuse the appointment of any successor co-trustee
after the successor co-trustee named in the trust
agreement. The IRS ruled that the right of the spouse to
refuse the appointment of further successor co-trustees
was not a general power of appointment over the trust
corpus and did not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.




CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer owned
a corporation which owned a ranch. The taxpayer wanted
to sell the ranch and decided to have the ranch transferred
to the taxpayer to facilitate the sale. The corporation
transferred the ranch to the taxpayer in exchange for a
promissory note equal to the book value of the ranch;
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however, no note was executed at the time of transfer. The
ranch was sold two years later, at which time it was
discovered that no note had been executed. A note was
written, dated as of the date of the original transfer but the
debtor made no payments due under the new written note
until the IRS initiated an audit of the transaction. The IRS
argued that the transfer of the ranch to the taxpayer was a
dividend payment because the note was not bona fide. The
court held that the debt was not bona fide because (1) the
note was not executed until two years after the transfer and
after the ranch was sold to other parties, (2) no payments
were made on the note until an audit was started, and (3)
the note was back dated to make it appear to be
contemporaneous with the ranch transfer to the taxpayer.
Sweatman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-468.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayer was a
company which owned rental real properties. Two
brothers each own a one-half interest in the taxpayer. The
properties were managed by a corporation in which the
brothers also each owned 50 percent shares. The brothers
were not employees of the corporation and did not provide
the management services. The brothers had not executed a
partnership agreement as to the taxpayer, but the taxpayer
filed Form 1065s for five years, although the brothers
considered themselves as equal owners of the properties,
not the company. Because of management disputes, the
brothers agreed to exchange their partial interests in all the
properties for full interests in some of the properties. The
IRS noted that Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 held,
under similar facts, that the ownership of the properties
was not a partnership. The IRS ruled, however, that,
because the taxpayer filed Form 1065s for five years, the
taxpayer was considered a partnership and the exchange
involved an exchange of interests in a partnership which
do not qualify for like-kind exchange treatment. Ltr. Rul.
9741017, July 10, 1997.
PASSIVE INVESTMENT LOSSES. The taxpayer
owned interests in several passive activities and disposed
of several interests which had current year and suspended
past year passive activity losses. The dispositions were
elected to be qualified under I.R.C. § 469(g)(1)(A). The
taxpayer realized no gain on the dispositions. The IRS
ruled that where the taxpayer disposed of interests in
passive activities without gain and with current and
suspended passive activity losses, the taxpayer must first
net current and suspended passive activity income and
losses from the remaining passive activities before netting
the remaining current passive activity income with the
passive activity losses attributable to the disposed
interests. Ltr. Rul. 9742002, July 3, 1997.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELECTION. The IRS has issued a revenue procedure
providing for automatic allowance of late election by a
corporation to be taxed as an S corporation. The automatic
relief can be obtained in two situations: (1) the corporation
intended to be an S corporation, the corporation and
shareholders have reported their income consistent with S
corporation status for the taxable year the election was
first intended and all subsequent years, and the corporation
did not receive notification from the IRS within six
months after the due date for the return for the first tax
year as an S corporation that any problem existed with S
corporation status; and (2) for elections involving periods
prior to January 1, 1997, the corporation intended to be an
S corporation, the corporation was not permitted an S
corporation election because the election was filed late,
and the relevant tax years for the corporation and all
shareholders are still open. The procedure does not
provide relief for late shareholder elections such as QSST
elections or the small business trust election. Rev. Proc.
97-48, I.R.B. 1997-, __.
The taxpayer was a corporation form in 1992 as a C
corporation. In March 1993, the corporation filed a Form
1120S and the shareholders filed individual income tax
returns reflecting pass-through of corporation income. The
IRS claimed that the Form 2553 for the S corporation
election was not received by the IRS and provided
testimony of its employees that the IRS had no record of
receipt of the form. The corporation presented testimony
of the employees of its accountant that the form was
prepared, placed in an envelop with sufficient postage and
mailed at a post office. The court held that proof of
mailing required proof of the postmark; therefore, the
corporation failed to prove receipt by the IRS and could
not file as an S corporation. McLane Land & Timber
Co. v. United States, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,817 (W.D. Ark. 1997).
TAX LIEN. In 1993, the IRS assessed taxes against
the taxpayer, creating a tax lien. In May 1995, the
taxpayer became a distributee under a will of a deceased
parent. In August 1995, the taxpayer disclaimed, in a
disclaimer effective under Texas law as of the date of the
decedent’s death, any interest in the estate and sought to
remove any tax lien against the disclaimed property. The
District Court held that the taxpayer's disclaimer of
bequeathed property under Texas law had no effect on a
federal tax lien that previously attached to the property.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the tax lien did
not attach to the disclaimed property because the taxpayer
did not ever take possession of the bequeathed property,
the property did not immediately pass to the taxpayer at
the death of the decedent under state law, and the
disclaimer was effective under state law as of the date of
death. Leggett v. United States, 120 F.3d 592 (5th Cir.
1997), rev’g, 78 AFTR2d ¶ 96-5339 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
November 1997
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.69 5.61 5.57 5.55
110% AFR 6.27 6.17 6.12 6.09
120% AFR 6.84 6.73 6.67 6.64
Mid-term
AFR 6.10 6.01 5.97 5.94
110% AFR 6.72 6.61 6.56 6.52
120% AFR 7.34 7.21 7.15 7.10
Long-term
AFR 6.42 6.32 6.27 6.24
110% AFR 7.07 6.95 6.89 6.85
120% AFR 7.72 7.58 7.51 7.46
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LANDLORD AND TENANT
REPLACEMENT LEASE. The defendant had
entered into a lease of the plaintiffs’ farm with the
plaintiffs’ parents for 1992 through 1997. The parents died
in 1992 and 1994, with the farm passing to the plaintiffs.
The defendant approached the plaintiffs and offered to
enter into a lease for 1995. The defendant produced a
typed lease which was signed by both parties. The new
lease did not mention the previous lease and the plaintiffs
testified that the new lease was meant to replace the old
lease with the parents.  The plaintiffs sold the farm to a
third party, effective at the end of the new lease. The
defendant claimed that the old lease was still effective for
1997, that the old lease gave the defendant equity rights in
the farm and that the old lease gave the defendant a right
of first refusal on any sale of the farm. The trial court
ruled for the plaintiffs after the defendant, representing
himself, failed to present any evidence. The appellate
court affirmed, holding that the new lease was intended to
replace the lease with the parents. Evenstad v. Buchholz,
567 N.W.2d 194 (N.D. 1997).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ANIMAL FEED. The plaintiff was a dairy farmer
who purchased cattle feed from one defendant and
manufactured by the other defendant. The plaintiff
claimed that the feed was contaminated with metal pieces
which caused the dairy cows to suffer “hardware disease.”
The plaintiff discovered metal pieces in the feed by
running the feed under a magnet which removed some of
the metal. A jury found that the feed was contaminated
and caused damage to the plaintiff’s entire 200 head herd
of dairy cows. The appellate court remanded the case,
holding that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient
evidence to support the jury verdict as to all the cows. The
court found that the plaintiff had presented evidence of
only eleven cows diagnosed with diseases caused by metal
contamination and that the evidence of future diseases and
other sick animals was not sufficiently linked to the metal
contamination. Purina Mills v. Odell, 948 S.W.2d 927
(Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
PESTICIDE. The plaintiff owned and operated a
sweet potato farm and applied to the crop a pesticide
manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff brought suit
for insect damage to the crop under theories of failure to
warn of a known defect, breach of express warranty and
strict liability. The evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff
failed to follow label directions and industry standards as
to the time of application of the pesticide and that the
damage was caused by insects controlled by the pesticide.
The court held that all of the actions were pre-empted by
FIFRA except the strict liability theory of liability.
However, because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that
the pesticide was applied properly or that the damage was
caused by insects controlled by the pesticide, the court
held for the defendant. Deshotel v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.,
969 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. La. 1997).
TRESPASS
ABANDONED RIGHT-OF-WAY. In March 1982 a
railroad abandoned a rail line running adjacent to the
plaintiff’s farm property. The railroad removed the rails in
December 1985. In October 1988, the railroad entered into
a licensing agreement allowing the defendant access to the
rail line for installation and operation of a fiber optic
communications system. In July 1989, the defendant
installed the system on the abandoned rail line adjacent to
the plaintiff’s land. The plaintiff sought a judgment
quieting title in the plaintiff and for damages for trespass
by the defendant. The plaintiff argued that title vested in
the plaintiff immediately after the rail lines were removed.
The defendant argued that title did not vest in the plaintiff
because, under Ind. Code §§ 8-4-35-6, -7, the plaintiff was
required to first file an affidavit of title or to record the
title claim, neither of which was done by the plaintiff.  The
court held that during the existence of the railroad’s right-
of-way, the plaintiff held title to the land up to the
centerline of the right-of-way, subject to the right-of-way
held by the railroad. When the railroad abandoned the
right-of-way, the burden on the plaintiff’s title disappeared
and full title revested in the plaintiff. Because the railroad
had no interest in the plaintiff’s portion of the right-of-
way, the railroad could not convey any portion of the land
in a licensing agreement. Therefore, the defendant had no
right to install the system on the plaintiff’s portion of the
right-of-way. Calumet Nat’l Bank v. AT & T, 682
N.E.2d 785 (Ind. 1997).
CITATION UPDATES
Swain v. U.S., 969 F. Supp. 515 (C.D. Ill. 1997)
(transfers with retained powers) see p. 141 supra.
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2d ANNUAL SEMINAR IN PARADISE
  
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 5-9, 1998
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1998! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and
the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar
on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.
The seminar is scheduled for January 5-9, 1998 at the
spectacular ocean-front Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort on
the Big Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each
day, Monday through Friday, with a continental breakfast
and break refreshments included in the registration fee.
Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 400 page
seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning:
Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the
seminar.
     Here are the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment
payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation
and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, family-owned business exclusion,
handling life insurance, marital deduction planning,
disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both
spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future
interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden" gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including
income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part
sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
   •  Ethics (2 hours).
The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements for
group discount air fares on United Airlines, available
through Sun Quest Vacations. In addition, attendees are
eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the
Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort, the site of the seminar.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares
and insure availability of convenient flights at a busy travel
time of the year.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current
subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest or the
Agricultural Law Manual. The registration fee for
nonsubscribers is $695.
If you have not yet received a registration packet call
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